The 1990s were a time of change in Icelandic welfare, just as in some of the other Nordic countries. Unlike in Sweden and Finland the changes in Iceland were not particularly induced by economic crisis at the beginning of the decade. Iceland did, however, begin the decade with a significant recession in the economy and growing unemployment. The changes in Iceland emerged more distinctly during the upswing of the latter part of the 1990s and can partly be related to a change of ideological currents.
THE BASELINE POSITION
Before taking stock of the trends it is important to set the stage by briefly outlining the general character of the Icelandic welfare state in comparison with the other Nordic welfare states. The Icelandic welfare state has for a long time been much cheaper in terms of expenditures than the other Nordic ones. In the year 2000 Iceland was spending 19.5% of GDP on health and welfare jointly while the others were in the region of 25.2 -32.3% of GDP (1) . The main reasons for the low expenditure ratio in Iceland are lower social security pension benefits, extensive use of means testing of benefits, a larger role for the private and third sectors in welfare provisions and a lower proportion of old-age pensioners in the population owing to higher long-term fertility rates in Iceland. The health sector in Iceland is, however, fully on a level with the Scandinavian health sectors as regards expenditure. This is the only significant part of the Icelandic welfare state that is comparable in terms of resources.
Iceland thus has less extensive public welfare provision than the Scandinavian countries generally, and the role of self-help through work participation, family provision and third-sector voluntary provisions is larger. In many ways Iceland seems to have some significant liberal characteristics in its welfare system (especially in social security benefits provisions), along with typically universalistic features such as in health, education and child care (2, 3) . In that sense Iceland only partly qualifies as a Scandinavian welfare model in Esping-Andersen's sense (4) .
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS DURING THE 1990S
The Icelandic economy had started to stagnate from 1988 as a result of unfavourable conditions in the fishing sector and by 1992 this had evolved into a fully fledged economic recession, with negative growth rates and rising unemployment, going from the most typical postwar level of around 1% to more than 5% in 1995. This was an all-time record in Iceland. During the recession pay levels declined somewhat but welfare benefits maintained their levels better, hence the income distribution continued to become more equal up to 1994.
By 1995 the economy was again in upswing, driven by the generally favourable economic climate internationally, increasing access to loans to finance private consumption and higher investment levels in Icelandic industry, especially in energy-intensive industry. General real pay levels increased continually from 1995 to 2002 and the government launched a privatization scheme which stimulated the already much more liberalized financial market and the newly established stock market. Earnings from privatization helped to balance the budget on the positive side and induce changes in taxation law, primarily favouring businesses (income tax rates on businesses were lowered from around 50% at the beginning of the decade to about 18% at its end). Taxing of capital income was similarly lowered from more than 40% to 10% with the introduction of new legislation on capital tax. At the same time the government failed to allow the tax-free bracket and the personal allowance sum to follow general price increases and hence the effective tax rate on the lowest incomes was significantly raised. Amongst the effects of this change was the introduction of tax payments on basic social security pensions, which had previously been tax free, and the effective tax rate on lower and medium earnings from the labour market was also raised. So the share of the burden shifted from the higher end of the income ladder to the middle and lower end (according to figures from the Ministry of Finance in Iceland).
In this way the taxation system lost some of its equalizing power. The Gini coefficient for real family equivalent earnings (after tax and benefits) increased from 0.270 in 1994 to 0.329 in 2000, a rise of about 22%. The degree of inequality amongst single persons did not increase as much as that of families (5) . In Denmark the degree of inequality of real family earnings went from 0.22 to 0.24 between 1994 and 2000 (6) . Thus the growth of inequality was much more extensive in Iceland than in Denmark, and it also seems to have been more extensive than in Finland and Sweden where it increased significantly more than in Denmark. In Finland the Gini coefficient for real family equivalent earnings went from 0.217 to 0.247, a rise of 13.8%, and in Sweden it went from 0.221 to 0.252, a rise of 14%, between 1995 and 2000 (7) . (Note that the Gini coefficients may not be comparable for assessing degree of inequality between the countries but the trends are still indicative of real changes.)
Government-induced changes in taxation were not the only cause of growing inequality of incomes. Changes in social security and unemployment benefits also contributed to that outcome.
TREND IN SOCIAL SECURITY AND OTHER WELFARE BENEFITS
In 1995 the government changed the rules for indexation of social security benefits from earnings to prices. This was comparable to what the Thatcher government did in Britain, with the consequence that pension benefits lagged behind wages (8) . In Iceland this change is already producing a growing gap between social security pensions and labour market pay. In 1993 the main part of the old-age and invalidity pension from social security was close to 80% of the lowest bargained pay in the labour market and by 2001 this proportion was down to about 58% (9) . The gap between pensions and average wages also increased, but not quite as much since the minimum wage rose faster than average wages, especially in the bargaining round in 1997. This means that the majority of pension recipients in Iceland did not enjoy the upswing to the same extent as other Icelanders. This position was of course made worse by the introduction of income taxation on minimum pensions from social security.
The rules for indexing unemployment benefit were similarly changed in 1997. Instead of being tied to changes in common pay in the fish processing industry the unemployment benefit, which is a fixed and flat sum, became tied to price rises. In 2003 it is about 77.000 Icelandic kró nur per month and if the previous rules had been maintained it would be about 97.000 kró nur. So it has lagged decisively behind the wages in the labour market (10) .
Child benefits became heavily income tested after 1996 and thereby a sizeable proportion of recipients lost this benefit, reducing the overall cost of child benefits from a little more than 6 billion kró nur in 1996 to just over 4 billion kró nur (figures are at 2003 price levels). After that means testing was slightly eased again and eligibility thereby increased, in the wake of heavy criticism of the government. In 2003 a little more than 1.5 billion kró nur, about 20%, is still lacking for the benefit expenditures to equal the real level they were at in 1991, according to the Ministry of Finance.
The most positive welfare initiative of the decade was the introduction of fathers' leave in case of the birth of a new child in the family. This started with two weeks' provision in 1997 but by 2000 it allowed for an overall right to parental leave of nine months, three for each of the parents and the remaining three could be utilized by either one of them. Fathers maintain 80% of their regular pay during such a leave, which is unusually generous for Icelandic welfare benefits. This was presented as the reigning government's main welfare achievement in the debates for the spring election of 2003. After the election, however, it emerged that the financial base of the programme is insecure and requires considerable additional funding. There are also growing complaints about the high cost of the programme.
Sickness benefits in Iceland are primarily negotiated in the labour market and take the form of an acquired right to maintain pay during sickness. The right accumulates with length of working career with the same employer. It generally ranges from one to three months, most commonly two months. When the longterm sick have exhausted this provision they can apply to their union for a sickness grant, which varies in size between unions, or they can apply for sickness pay (daily allowance) from the Social Security Administration (TR). That sum is now about 25% of minimum pay in the labour market, an unusually low benefit level in the community of the advanced countries. In 1990 sickness benefit from social security had been close to 35% of minimum pay so it has lagged behind the pay levels of the labour market since then, just as most other social security benefits did during the latter part of the 1990s (9) .
It is interesting to consider the different situations of Iceland and Denmark. The Danes have had generous unemployment benefits and high levels of unemployment for a long time. As part of activation measures during the 1990s the Danes lowered benefit levels at the same time as increasing efforts were made to employ parts of the unemployed population. This proved successful (11) . Iceland, on the other hand, has for a long time had low benefit levels and low unemployment problems, despite the surge between 1992 and 1995. At the same time Iceland has for a long time had by far the highest employment participation rates in the world (2, 12) . So there was no need to cut benefit levels for the unemployed, the elderly and invalids in order to give stronger incentives for work. Iceland is already the most active work society among the advanced nations. The evolution of welfare benefits in Iceland during the 1990s is therefore probably best explained with reference to an ideological shift in government, towards a stronger libertarian stance. Libertarian attitudes are quite influential in Iceland, and a particular example of this is the low-tax competition policy, which aims at increasing Iceland's international competitiveness for businesses by lowering corporation and property taxes drastically (13) . This has already been achieved with the reduction of corporate taxes from about 50% to 18% during the last decade. But libertarians aim for further cuts in this and other taxes, which if carried out will restrict the possibilities for government to maintain, let alone increase, welfare provision in Iceland.
The 1990s were also a decade of growing user fees in the healthcare sector and in education. Attempts at introducing market-oriented management procedures in the health sector increased, for example by contract financing, an increasing role for private parties in providing services and further growth of the already quite large third-sector welfare provision, often by means of service contracts to government. At the same time the use of means testing of welfare benefits in general was increased during the decade, leading to a lowering of expenditure on welfare benefits (as a percentage of GDP).
Expenditure on healthcare, on the other hand, increased considerably during the decade. In 1990 Iceland was amongst the lowest in healthcare expenditure at 7.8% of GDP but by 2000 the figure had increased to 9.4% of GDP, thus topping the bill in the Nordic countries (15) . This greater increase in Iceland than in the other countries is surprising in view of the fact that the Icelandic population is the youngest of the Nordic populations. The fact that the state hospitals in Iceland face a continual problem in making ends meet despite these increases in overall healthcare expenditure calls for research into the organization and functioning of the healthcare system.
Iceland still boasts an outstanding achievement in reducing infant mortality. During the 1990s the rate was lowered continually, ending the decade with 1.2 deaths of children below one year of age per 1000 live births. The comparable figures for the other Nordic countries ranged from 2.4 to 3.1. Average life expectancy in Iceland also remains amongst the highest at 78.1 for men at birth and 82.2 for women. Sweden was, however, close to Iceland in this respect (15) .
When the developments of the 1990s are taken together it seems that the goal for the future has been set on reducing the role of government in welfare provision in Iceland. This is of course a reduction from a level of welfare provision that is lower than that which prevails in the other Nordic countries, excluding the health sector, which ranks amongst the highest. Such a policy is made easier by the fact that occupational pension funds in Iceland are quite strong. This pension provision is class-related in the sense that it provides rights in proportion to previous earnings so that higher income groups get significantly higher pensions than lower income group members. As the occupational pension rights mature, which will take another one to two decades, these funds will provide some 50 -60% of former pay in pension benefits. The use of means-testing rules in the public social security system up to now has meant that as other earnings of pensioners increase the amount obtained from public provision is reduced. In 2000 the rules for means testing were changed such that in the future pensions from occupational funds will reduce the public pension just as much as employment earnings do now. In the long run this will have the effect of systematically reducing the role of the public social security system towards that of only providing for those who cannot accumulate rights with a lifetime career in the labour market.
CONCLUSIONS
The 1990s were indeed a decade that saw considerable changes in Icelandic society. One can say that the developments have been dualistic, in the sense that the population which has enjoyed full participation in the labour market has obtained a steady rise in real earnings since 1995, which is a long period of growth even though growth rates are modest by the standards of the three preceding decades (14) . Despite rising income tax rates on lower and average earnings the net outcome is an improvement for the majority of the population, albeit with considerable increases in private household debts at the same time. On the other hand, the sector of the population that has had to rely on the public welfare system (some old-age pensioners, invalidity pensioners, the long-term sick, families with children and the unemployed) has been left behind and in some cases they have even had to carry a heavier burden, such as with medical and housing expenses. On the whole those who had the least at the beginning of the decade gained the least during the upswing while those who had the most also gained the most. For the latter group the improved opportunities to expand wealth and property ownership during the period of increasingly liberalized markets and the boom years of the Internet bubble were decisive for increasing their fortunes, but favourable changes in the taxation laws also helped that group.
Given the baseline position of the Icelandic welfare state as less protective and less generous than the other Nordic welfare states, except in the field of health and hospital care, the trend of the 1990s can be seen as indicating an erosion of the public commitment to welfare provision. The fact that the forces of erosion were strongest during the economic upswing of the latter part of the 1990s is indicative of a policy shift, which could, however, change again. The policy orientation of future governments will therefore be of great importance for the health of the Icelandic welfare state.
